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C h a p t e r 9
Reconstruction Without Reconciliation:
Is Northern Ireland a ‘‘Model’’?
James Hughes
Elite discourses about the lessons to be drawn from the Northern Ireland
conflict and the 1998 Belfast Agreement share many of the same concerns
as those in academia concerned with designing fixes to violent conflict and
postconflict reconciliation and reconstruction. A curious feature of the dis-
course about Northern Ireland being a ‘‘model’’ for conflict resolution is
that it stresses process over outcome. There is much emphasis on ‘‘dia-
logue’’ while there is also much reticence about promoting the actual con-
tent of the agreements that brought the violent conflict to an end—the
consociational institutional engineering—as a key element in the ‘‘model.’’
There is also much reticence about structural features of the conflict and
the challenges of reconciliation and reconstruction in a divided society. The
major lesson that policy makers have drawn from this case is that even the
most protracted conflicts can be ended, and ‘‘dialogue’’ with the extremes
can pay dividends for peacemaking. It is a paradox of the peace agreement
in Northern Ireland that the ethnic power reallocation under consociation-
alism has fostered interethnic elite accommodation and cooperation, while
at least in the short term hardening the obstacles to a social transformation
from divided society to a more integrated one. Criticisms of consociational-
ism tend to reflect a normative repulsion to the ethnification of politics
entailed in its institutional features (invariably understood as a reification
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246 James Hughes
of ethnicity that perpetuates conflict), and the perception of political stasis
that it creates. An undoubted strength of consociationalism is that it fosters
stability and trust by working with, rather than against, the political realities
of identity politics in a divided society by entrenching ethnic blocs in
power. However, it also severely constrains what kind of postconflict recon-
struction is possible by posing limits to the forging of shared identities and
limiting the possibility of new politics and policies to promote structural
change to the divided society. We must accept, however, that the structures
of the divide, and the identity politics that they have engendered in North-
ern Ireland, have developed over centuries and are thus deeply embedded
and will not easily or quickly be undone.
The Northern Ireland Model
Politicians have presented the Northern Ireland conflict as a model for
conflict resolution. As the most protracted conflict to afflict an advanced
democracy in modern times, it might seem odd to present this thirty-year-
long ethnonational and sectarian conflict as a model. The very protracted-
ness would, on first principles, suggest a gross failure of political and mili-
tary management. However, the reason why this case is represented as a
model appears to lie more in the fact that the conflict was ended at all. This
was the lesson drawn by George Mitchell, the US mediator in the conflict
(1995–98), when he stated that Northern Ireland and his other peace-
building experience demonstrated that ‘‘there’s no such thing as a conflict
that cannot be ended. Conflicts are created, conducted, and sustained by
human beings. They can be ended by human beings’’ (Mitchell 2002). Simi-
larly President Bill Clinton, at a time when he was deeply engaged in negoti-
ations in the Middle East conflict, was one of the first to point to the
international demonstration effects of the Belfast Agreement (1998) (here-
after the Agreement). Clinton stressed the symbolic importance of the fact
that the parties to one of the world’s most protracted conflicts had reached
a settlement: ‘‘And let me tell you, you cannot imagine the impact of the
Good Friday Agreement in Northern Ireland on troubled regions of the
world—in Africa and the Middle East, in Latin America and, of course, in
the Balkans, where the United States has been heavily involved in my time.
Peace continues to be challenged all around the world. It is more important
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Is Northern Ireland a ‘‘Model’’? 247
than ever to say: but look what they did in Northern Ireland and look what
they are doing in Northern Ireland’’ (Clinton 2000). Drawing on this peace-
building expertise, President Barack Obama subsequently appointed Mitch-
ell as his Middle East peace envoy in January 2009. In his speech in Belfast
in June 2013, Obama applauded the Agreement for setting an ‘‘example’’
and as a ‘‘blueprint to follow’’ for other conflicts, while recognizing that
there were still ‘‘many miles to go’’ in building peace (Obama 2013). Is
there anything more to the Northern Ireland peace agreement than an
example of the ending of a protracted conflict? If there is, what precisely
are these elements?
The views of British practitioners on the concept of the model empha-
size the importance of the process of mediation itself (the ‘‘peace process,’’
‘‘dialogue,’’ ‘‘talking with terrorists,’’ etc). Former secretary of state for
Northern Ireland Peter Hain, for example, in a speech to the Royal Institute
of International Affairs in London in June 2007 promoting Northern Ire-
land as a model of conflict resolution identified four main components:
the importance of personalities, the aligning of international influence, the
political framework, and dialogue. Hain shied away from the explicit
endorsement of the actual content of the Agreement, which involved a
complex system of consociational institutional engineering. In fact, Hain
declared, the ‘‘detailed structures are secondary to a basic political will to
agree,’’ and developing dialogue in the peace process was ‘‘arguably . . . its
ultimate objective.’’ For Hain, Northern Ireland offered lessons for conflicts
as diverse as Iraq, Sri Lanka, Basque Country, Kashmir, and Western Sahara
(Hain 2007a). As a consequence of the success in Northern Ireland, the
Irish government has placed conflict resolution and mediation at the core
of its stated foreign policy objectives through its Conflict Resolution Initia-
tive. Drawing on the experience of Northern Ireland, the Irish government
aims to become a ‘‘world leader’’ in UN mediation efforts and has begun
to establish a number of special roving ambassadors to crisis regions.
A key British negotiator and Blair advisor, Jonathan Powell, has also
recently argued that the importance of the Agreement lies in the way that
engaging and ‘‘talking to terrorists’’ moved them from violence to demo-
cratic politics. It was a case of building peace from the extremes rather than
from the moderate center ground. Controversially, he posited that a similar
process of engagement is required with al Qa’ida (Powell 2008). When the
British government applied the lessons from peacemaking in Northern Ire-
land in its foreign policy, they also drew on practitioner expertise. Former
After Civil War : Division, Reconstruction, and Reconciliation in Contemporary Europe, edited by Bill Kissane, University of
         Pennsylvania Press, Inc., 2015. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/londonschoolecons/detail.action?docID=3442433.
Created from londonschoolecons on 2017-10-07 13:00:00.
Co
py
rig
ht
 ©
 2
01
5.
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f P
en
ns
ylv
an
ia
 P
re
ss
, I
nc
.. 
Al
l r
ig
ht
s 
re
se
rv
ed
.
248 James Hughes
secretary of state for Northern Ireland Paul Murphy was engaged in media-
tion in Sri Lanka by the Sri Lankan, British, and Norwegian governments.
As part of the mediation exercise, former Provisional Irish Republican
Army (PIRA) leader, and now deputy first minister in the new government
of Northern Ireland, Martin McGuinness was asked to visit Sri Lanka in
January and June 2006. McGuinness also cochaired, with former South
African government minister Roelf Meyer, mediation talks between Iraqi
groups held in Finland in September 2007, which led to the Helsinki Agree-
ment between the main Sunni, Shia, and Kurdish groups at a pivotal
moment in the US military and political ‘‘surge’’ in Iraq. Subsequently,
Sheikh Humam Hamoudi, chair of the Constitutional Review Committee
(CRC) of the Iraqi Parliament, led an EU-sponsored CRC study delegation
of fifteen representatives to Northern Ireland in March 2008, and there was
a follow-up visit in May 2009 by members of the Article 23 Committee of
the Iraqi Council of Representatives, charged with resolving the dispute
over Kirkuk. The nature of the lessons to be drawn from Northern Ireland
were written up in a UN report that stressed issues such as leadership,
power sharing, dialogue and inclusion, equality, human rights and reconcil-
iation, the role of civil society, and security and public order, all of which
were considered to be critical for reaching a peaceful solution to the North-
ern Ireland conflict and to the process of promoting national dialogue in
Iraq (Iraq Helsinki Project 2009; Hinds and Oliver 2009).
There is clearly a disjuncture between how the Northern Ireland
‘‘model’’ is being framed by politicians as a matter of ‘‘process’’ and ‘‘dia-
logue,’’ while in practice the lesson learning that is being demonstrated is
often of a more pragmatic nature with regard to institutional and policy
practice changes on the ground. Equally, there is dissonance between the
politicians’ emphasis on ‘‘dialogue’’ and much of the political science analy-
sis of the ending of the conflict and the Agreement. For academics the
importance of the accommodation in Northern Ireland lies less in the proc-
ess and more in how it has been engineered as a framework of institutional
and other reforms. Both the supporters and critics of the Agreement alike
concur that it is constructed around a consociational framework. Among
the ranks of the most robust defenders of the Agreement are also the most
persistent advocates of consociationalism for Northern Ireland, and equally
the most fervent opponents of the Agreement are the most trenchant critics
of consociationalism. The pivot for the schism in scholarly approaches is
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whether one positively or negatively evaluates the value of consociational-
ism as a conflict regulation mechanism.
As academic enthusiasm for consociationalism in Northern Ireland was
revitalized in the 1990s, advocates such as McGarry and O’Leary located
their analysis of the conflict within Liphart’s paradigm of ‘‘deeply divided
societies,’’ though with some significant modifications. Whereas Lijphart
problematized the accommodation of confessional and linguistic ‘‘segmen-
tal’’ cleavages in states where politics was rather conventionally concerned
with the democratic politics of power and resource allocation between such
groups, McGarry and O’Leary connected consociational theory more firmly
to theories of ethnonationalism, violent conflict, and state-building. Mc-
Garry and O’Leary seek to ‘‘champion’’ consociationalism normatively as
the most effective way to manage the historically grounded and competing
variants of Irish-British ethnonationalisms that have been the key driver in
the conflict (McGarry and O’Leary 2009, 24). Other structural features and
epiphenomena of the conflict, they suggest, such as sectarianism, and by
implication segregation, have derived from the ethnonational ‘‘root cause.’’
For them, the Agreement is a ‘‘worked’’ example of conflict resolution pre-
cisely because it addresses the binational nature of politics in Northern
Ireland. They also locate the study of political accommodation in Northern
Ireland within a comparative framework, which holds that it has both
incorporated past experience while also providing transferable lessons and
benefits to other conflict cases, such as Iraq (McGarry and O’Leary 1990;
McGarry 2001; McGarry and O’Leary 2004; O’Leary and McGarry 2006).
The academic critics, mainly liberals but also those on the Left, are
unsettled by the consociational theory underpinning the Agreement, and
its underlying philosophy. The critique has pragmatic and normative
dimensions. First, critics regard the theory to be a ‘‘group’’ differentiated
approach to governing divided societies, which by institutionalizing power
sharing among the ethnic or other blocs that constitute the divided society,
merely serves to institutionalize the conflict and allows no possibility of
transcending the divide. This is seen as inherently unstable. Second, the
institutionalization of divisions is regarded as a fetishization of ethnic and
other cultural markers, which is a normative contravention of any notion
of the liberal individualism seen as underpinning democracy, or of a mobi-
lization around social class, which is important still for some on the Left.
The critics of the Agreement contend that its consocational design lacks a
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250 James Hughes
grounding in ‘‘democratic governance’’ and serves only to reproduce sys-
temic sectarianism. Rather than overcoming the causes and legacies of the
‘‘Troubles’’, it is argued, the consociational institutions embed and rein-
force them. Moreover, critics are unsettled also by the fact that the peace
process and its electoral process has led to the entrenchment of the repre-
sentatives of ‘‘extreme’’ forms of nationalism and unionism—Sinn Fe´in
and the Democratic Unionist Party. That the peace process was inclusive,
drawing in the political extremes of both sides to cooperate within a conso-
ciational framework, is a feature of the Northern Ireland settlement that
particularly rankles with liberals. The peace is perceived by them as having
been won by the extremists, and the ‘‘bad guys,’’ who have been rewarded
with power. This elitist undercurrent in this critique frames the competing
ethnonationalisms as a form of false consciousness, contingently mobilized
and ensuing from the drift to violent conflict in the late 1960s. Fundamen-
tally, the critiques of consociationalism deride an outcome that, they claim,
offers no vision of the ‘‘common good’’ or the ‘‘good life.’’ In sum, it is a
nightmarish dead end of sectarian politics. In effect, the approach is condi-
tioned by an ideological or normative preference for liberal values and a
class divide over what are perceived to be polarized essentialist ethnona-
tional and sectarian communities (Taylor 2001 and 2009; Wilford and Wil-
son 2006; Wilson 2009 and 2010).
What McGarry and O’Leary and their critics share is a focus on the role
of elites and the institutions of government. For McGarry and O’Leary, the
Agreement is analyzed as an elite pact (with local, regional, and interna-
tional constituents) that has engineered an institutional fix to end the con-
flict. For the critics, it is the wrong kind of elite deal and a misengineered
fix. The debate between both approaches, in essence, turns on whether the
deal is viewed as a progressive outcome or not. The shared focus on elites
and institutions, however, addresses only one level of the conflict, though
obviously it is a critical one. There are other levels. These approaches tend
to objectify society. Society is the seemingly inactive canvass on which elite
politics and the institutional fix is overlain. Both approaches decouple their
defense from a contextualization of consociationalism, assuming that the
forms and structures of the deeply divided society in Northern Ireland are
inherently self-evident, and, importantly, that the societal divisions are
somehow either predetermined and set, or readily transformable. The
nature of the societal divisions, and how they are reflected in socioeco-
nomic structures and everyday realities, is fundamental to the debate about
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Is Northern Ireland a ‘‘Model’’? 251
the ‘‘root cause’’ of the conflict, and therefore fundamental to evaluating
the outcome of the conflict.
Does not the kind of diversity matter for conflict and its outcome?
McGarry and O’Leary offer a ‘‘two nations’’ perspective on the conflict,
declaring that Northern Ireland is a ‘‘bi-national place, a sub-set of the
category of pluri-national places, which have more than one mobilized
national community’’ (McGarry and O’Leary 2009, 25). In such places, they
affirm, national and ethnic identities are politically salient and are testable
by examining the nature of party competition and civil society. The ques-
tion, however, is not simply does the nature of party competition and the
organization of civil society reflect nationalist ideological, ethnic, and/or
religious social cleavages, but also how are those cleavages socially embed-
ded? The nature of the deeply divided society in Northern Ireland is in flux,
and new social factors, such as new immigrants, are in play. Consequently,
we cannot evaluate the Agreement and whether it is a ‘‘model’’ without
taking account of the social basis of the conflict, the dynamism of social
change, and structural impediments to social change.
There are three interwoven strands to the analysis that follows. First, I
want to shift the focus from the new governing institutions and bring soci-
ety back into our discussions. Is the divided society in Northern Ireland
fixed or in flux? Second, by analyzing social dynamism, we may be better
positioned to evaluate some of the elite discourse and mindsets about the
outcome of the peace process, in particular, the swelling elite discourse
around the notion that Northern Ireland is a model of conflict resolution.
Third, I aim to demonstrate that the objectification discourse and mindset
is a current that permeates not only academia and political and managerial-
administrative elites, but also those parts of civil society engaged in peace
building and reconciliation. By shifting the lens to society, I aim to refocus
attention on the structural foundations of the divide and the Agreement,
and the prospects for reconstruction and reconciliation, for any evaluation
of whether Northern Ireland is a ‘‘model’’ must take the structural factors
into account.
The Parallel Communities of Consociational Society
The Agreement is seen as historic precisely because it is presented, and
indeed its implementation was organized so, in a manner to bring to a
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252 James Hughes
conclusion not just the conflict in Northern Ireland, but also the deeper
historical ethnonational conflict between British and Irish identities. The
political rhetoric of the elites about the Agreements reveals that they per-
ceive the outcome as a kind of ‘‘end of history,’’ where violence as a means
of resolving nationalist antagonisms has been transcended, although the
antagonisms themselves have not. Although the Agreement itself recog-
nized that changing society was a critical element of political stabilization,
its content in this area was minimal and rhetorical. The declaration at the
beginning of the Agreement stated a commitment to ‘‘the achievement of
reconciliation, tolerance, and mutual trust, and to the protection and vindi-
cation of the human rights of all.’’ The section on reconciliation and victims
of violence stated more specifically: ‘‘An essential aspect of the reconcilia-
tion process is the promotion of a culture of tolerance at every level of
society, including initiatives to facilitate and encourage integrated educa-
tion and mixed housing’’ (The Agreement 1998, 18). What accounts for this
lack of concern with social transformation in the Agreement?
We could interpret the Agreement in a positivist frame by understand-
ing it as a sequenced, two-stage solution to the conflict: achieve elite accom-
modation first, and society will follow (given that the erosion of the
segregation and parallel living of the two communities must be seen as a
much longer term project). Whereas the minutiae of the governing institu-
tions, security arrangements, and the relationships between the UK and
Ireland were specified in intricate detail in the Agreement, no such policy
specifications were made for societal transformation. This kind of elitist
institutionalist approach is intrinsic to the core thinking underlying conso-
ciationalism. For Lijphart, ‘‘accommodation’’ was a value that was to be
understood first and foremost as a ‘‘spirit of accommodation’’ between
political leaders—the elites involved in making the consociational institu-
tions work (Lijphart 1975, 103–4).
However, we can examine the challenge of social transformation in a
segregated society along several key dimensions: housing, education, public
service provision, culture, and employment, among others. There is a gen-
eral recognition that the two key pillars of the parallel communities—
housing and education—are durable features of Northern Ireland’s divided
society. The Harbison report of 2002 (i.e., post-Agreement) on the state of
community relations in Northern Ireland observed that there is ‘‘little evi-
dence of significant increases in shared education or housing’’ (Harbison
2002, 4). The segregated living of parallel communities translates into
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multiple domains of segregation: relationships and marriage, work, culture,
use of public services and facilities (including welfare, health, and leisure),
use of public transport, employment, and shopping; and it even develops
its own psychological frame with regard to mental mapping, ‘‘ownership,’’
and movement within space, and calculations about risk and the desirabil-
ity of contact.
Let us explore one of the key dimensions—housing segregation—as a
means of illustrating some of the bigger questions about cause and effect in
the conflict. Segregation implies a strong emotive content to social values,
but it may be driven by many factors, including cultural distance and mutual
repulsion, racism, and most obviously in a conflict zone, by fear, anxiety,
risk, and insecurity. It is seen as a negative social phenomenon, the ‘‘laager
mentality’’ that embeds and reinforces mutual ignorance, which in turn may
both consolidate the support of hardliners and conflict entrepreneurs, and
also be manipulated by such groups. Official statistics and independent aca-
demic research reveal a high degree of territorial segregation in the housing
of the two main religious groups since the start of the ‘‘Troubles’’. Scholars
of spatial segregation in Northern Ireland such as Shirlow have argued that
the phenomenon is impelled by a political logic to mobilize fear through
‘‘propaganda conditioning’’ and thereby create ethnoreligious ‘‘enclosures’’
(Shirlow 2003, 77). In a segregated society ‘‘psychological barriers are rein-
forced by physical boundaries’’ (Hughes et al. 2007, 46). This interpretation
reinforces the elitist understanding of politics in Northern Ireland, with the
two communities being the objects of social conditioning by elites within
their respective ‘‘laagers,’’ but it also ignores the colonial origins and develop-
ment of ethnic and religious segregation as an imposition by state policy over
many hundreds of years.
The weakness of the historical data makes it difficult to ascertain just
how far back the antecedents of housing sectarianism stretch. Key studies
have suggested that segregation along ethnic and religious lines originated
in the Ulster Plantation in the early seventeenth century. The northern part
of Ireland was the last redoubt of Gaelic rule and culture in Ireland, which
was overwhelmingly agrarian. Town building became part of the coloniza-
tion process. In Ulster, as had been the case with colonization in the rest of
Ireland, towns were largely fortified English garrisons and administrative
centers, and the native Irish were usually segregated to poor lands in rural
areas and settlements outside the town walls in the ubiquitous ‘‘Irish-
towns’’—a nomenclature that is preserved today in many towns and cities
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in Ireland. Certainly, there is evidence of ethnic and religious segregation
in the pattern of urbanization that developed as a result of the development
of the linen and shipbuilding industries in the nineteenth century. Accord-
ing to influential studies by Boal, segregation in Belfast increased in peri-
odic surges. Census data provides robust evidence that by 1911, 41 percent
of Catholics and 62 percent of Protestants were living in segregated areas.
Between 1911 and 1969, residential segregation was driven by a ratchet
effect from episodes of interethnic violence in the early 1920s, during and
after partition, in 1935, during the Great Depression, and in the period
from 1969 after the outbreak of the ‘‘Troubles’’ (Boal 1982, 253; Boal 1999).
Discrimination in housing and employment by Protestants against
Catholics were major pillars of the Unionist regime, and even successive
British governments from the late 1960s on recognized that the escalating
conflict was driven by materialist grievances on the part of Catholics, which
Unionists were unwilling to address. Discrimination in the allocation of
public housing was one of the main causes of the emergence of the North-
ern Ireland civil rights movement in the mid-1960s (Purdie 1990). Housing
discrimination was not simply about the gerrymandering of local political
control by Unionists, but was part of the more systemic ethnonational
hegemony. The ‘‘ethnic cleansing’’ violence of the early ‘‘Troubles’’ (1969–
72) consolidated the segregation of the working class of the two communi-
ties, especially in the capital, Belfast. It is estimated that the ethnic cleansing
in the Belfast area alone between August 1969 and February 1973 affected
between eight thousand families (minimum) and approximately fifteen
thousand families (maximum), or roughly between 6.6 percent and 11.8
percent of the population of the Belfast urban area—perhaps as many as
sixty thousand people (Darby and Morris 1974, summary page c).
At least forty-one security barriers, sometimes referred to locally as
‘‘peace lines,’’ were constructed in Belfast along the interfaces between the
Catholic and Protestant communities in north, west, southwest and east
Belfast after the beginning of the conflict in August 1969 (Jarman 2005a).
There are also a small number of security barriers in Derry and Portadown.
The first barbed-wire security barrier in Belfast was built by the British
army along the line of existing barricades between the working-class com-
munities of the Falls area (Catholic) and Shankill area (Protestant) after the
interethnic violence of August 1969. Twelve more were constructed in the
1970s, nine in the 1980s, and ten in the 1990s, with the barriers becoming
highly engineered large-scale concrete walls over time. A further nine were
constructed after the ceasefires and effective end of the violent conflict in
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1994 (Map 9.1). After 1969 housing became part of the systemic securitiza-
tion of Northern Ireland by the British state. The Northern Ireland Housing
Executive (NIHE) was established in 1971 to take the political heat out of
the contentious issue of public sector housing allocation by removing it
from local Unionist political control and centralizing it to a professional,
and it was hoped ‘‘neutral,’’ government agency. For security considera-
tions NIHE reinforced the segregation of public housing by preserving the
highly polarized territorial ethnoreligious divide established by the violence
and intimidation of the early 1970s. NIHE also constructed innumerable
‘‘informal’’ or disguised security walls as part of its reconstruction and
modernization of housing zones in Belfast.
The richest data on housing segregation is collected by NIHE, and by
the late 1990s its data revealed that of a housing stock of some 132,000
units, 42 percent were in Protestant-only estates, 30 percent were Catholic,
and 29 percent were classified as ‘‘integrated.’’ Murtagh has shown that
there is a strong correlation between districts that are stable in their reli-
gious demography, low rates of violence during the conflict, and higher
levels of NIHE-classified ‘‘integrated’’ housing (Murtagh 2001, 777–80).
These housing estates tend to be located in peripheral areas outside the
main conurbations. However, we should treat the claims of housing ‘‘inte-
gration’’ with caution. NIHE classifies ‘‘integrated’’ estates as those with
just a minimum of 10 percent Protestant or Catholic residents. Most studies
of bipolarized societies recognize that a much larger figure from each com-
munity is a reliable indicator of residential mixing. When Shirlow and Mur-
tagh attempted to measure segregation and mixing in Belfast, they found
that just 10.7 percent of Catholics and 7 percent of Protestants live in areas
that are 41 to 60 percent Protestant or Catholic—a more accurate and
realistic assessment of the low level of mixing (Shirlow and Murtagh 2006,
59–60). Model ‘‘integrated’’ public housing estates are only now being
developed by NIHE, but these involve only a few schemes of a few dozen
houses each in rural areas largely unscathed by the violence, and where
arguably people are already comfortable living together. The British govern-
ment’s research found that housing had become more segregated over the
twenty years since 1980. By 2003 more than 70 percent of Housing Execu-
tive estates were more than 90 percent Protestant or more than 90 percent
Roman Catholic (Community Relations Unit 2003).
There are also other types of social enclosure. Observation suggests that
postconflict development in the main urban areas of Northern Ireland has
been characterized by significant growth in ‘‘elite spaces’’ and middle-class
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‘‘gated communities.’’ The 2011 census revealed that Catholics now out-
number Protestants by 49 percent to 42 percent in Belfast. Furthermore the
trend is for a growing Catholic population while the Protestant population
is in decline and ageing. The demographic shift of young, professional
Catholics with consumerist lifestyles fed by the postconflict economic
growth in the decade after 1998 to traditionally Protestant middle- and
lower-middle-class areas of southwest and east Belfast has accelerated.
Research tends to focus on working-class segregated communities, how-
ever, rather than the so-called ‘‘mixed’’ middle-class areas. The latest
research in this field finds that Catholics are more amenable to ‘‘mixing’’
and have more nuanced attitudes on politics and religion, whereas the
demonization of the ‘‘other’’ is more salient among Protestants, and the
difference in values may be related to perceptions of winners and losers
from the political accommodation in the Agreement itself (Hughes et al.
2007, 46).
One factor of social dynamism in Northern Ireland that may contribute
to social transformation sooner rather than later is new migration. The
2011 census identified that 5 percent of the population had an identity
other than British, Irish, or Northern Irish, and just under 4.5 percent were
born outside Britain and Ireland. About 2.5 percent of this minority is
composed of new migrants from the accession countries of the EU in cen-
tral and eastern Europe. The current wave of migration is a new trend for
several reasons: its speed and scale, the fact that the new migrants have no
prior connection with the UK or Ireland, and the fact that many are nomi-
nally Catholic (especially the Poles and Lithuanians) (Northern Ireland Sta-
tistics 2012). The scale of this new migration may also be underestimated.
If within the near future the migrants form 3 to 5 percent of the population,
it would be at a level where local politics could be affected. Furthermore,
the scale of migration is of a level where it is already a significant social
factor in local employment, housing, education, and religion (Jarman
2005b).
The analysis of housing presented above provides some insight into the
scale of segregation and the challenge facing any attempt at rapid social
transformation. The studies of housing segregation discussed above con-
clude that any social transformation of this reality is a long way into the
future. This must explain the lack of social content in the peace process
and in the Agreement itself. This social structure has major psychocultural
consequences for the behavior and values of groups and individuals, some
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258 James Hughes
of which I mentioned earlier, but it also has profound political effects, shap-
ing voting patterns and ethnifying public policy. Residential patterns have
a major impact on ethnic parades in Northern Ireland, which are a critical
form of ritual especially for the Protestant community. Historically this was
the case, and so it is today, even some fifteen years after the Agreement,
that Orange parades passing through or near Catholic areas continue to be
a significant source of provocation, interethnic tension, and violence. Some
four thousand parades were held in Northern Ireland in 2012, with about
60 percent being loyalist or unionist, and less than 4 percent nationalist.
The Parades Commission, a quasi-judicial government-appointed body,
was established in 1998 to attempt to promote understanding, facilitate
mediation, and make ‘‘determinations’’ whether contentious parades
should be allowed on a case-by-case basis. It has had mixed results in man-
aging contentious parades as evidenced by the increasing violence at inter-
faces around the time of ‘‘marching season.’’ Ross has suggested that an
important factor in building understanding and promoting trust over con-
tentious parades is the wider civic involvement of ‘‘civic leaders’’ (politi-
cians and community and business leaders) in the dialogue around a
‘‘negotiated redesign’’ of ritual to make them less provocative. Thus, Derry
has peacefully managed its annual Apprentice Boys’ parades (Ross 2007,
123–25). However, this is in essence a form of coexistence, not reconcilia-
tion in the sense of agreed narrative and shared ritual. In other places such
civic engagement, or indeed mediation, has not worked to reroute let alone
redesign parades, deal with issues such as flags, or stop violence, for exam-
ple, in parts of Belfast and Portadown.
The ‘‘New Public Management’’ Challenge
to Consociationalism
There was a dynamic tension within British policy making between the
consociational design of the Agreement and normative impulses for greater
‘‘integrationist’’ approaches to society in the immediate aftermath of the
Agreement. In particular, when the Agreement stalled, the British promoted
a much more ideologically ‘‘integrationist’’ outlook in public policy
agendas and began to challenge key structural pillars of segregation. ‘‘New
public management’’ usually refers to practices commonplace in the private
sector, particularly the imposition of a powerful management hierarchy
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that exerts discipline and is driven by cost efficiency, external accountability
and monitoring, and an emphasis on standards of evaluation. Encapsulated
within a ‘‘governance agenda,’’ aspects of the new managerialism were
developed under the reintroduction of British direct rule in Northern Ire-
land between 2002 and 2007 when the Agreement was temporarily sus-
pended by the British government. This was not simply a rational-technical
perspective on eliminating inefficiencies arising from the conflict but was
also an attempt to use social intervention policies to challenge the philo-
sophical foundation of the consociational settlement. The new managerial-
ist challenge evolved in two main guises. The first developed in the period
1999–2005 and entailed a more open ideological challenge. Beginning with
the publication of the consultation exercise on ‘‘community relations’’ in
1999, which led to the Harbison Report of 2002, and including the policy
ethos underlying the new Northern Ireland Executive’s draft program for
government of 2001, it culminated with the UK government’s A Shared
Future consultation and policy of 2003–5 (Consultation Document 2000;
Harbison 2002; Community Relations Unit 2003; Community Relations
Unit 2005). This policy focus on transcending the community divide
sooner rather than later coincided with the period 2000–2005, when the
consociational political institutions were in crisis and then suspended. It
was during this period of British direct rule that critics of consociationalism
pushed their agenda forward.
Harbison presented a stark policy choice for future policy: ‘‘separate
development’’ or ‘‘co-existence’’ versus a ‘‘a cohesive but pluralist society.’’
The former, he determined, was ‘‘inherently unstable, undesirable, inefficient
and not an outcome implied or desired in the Programme for Government.’’
The costs of a divided society, he argued, were unsustainable. He advocated
‘‘promoting inter-dependence,’’ and he offered two key proposals to move
ahead on social transformation: first to incentivize infrastructures ‘‘to pro-
mote better relations within and between communities’’; and second, to
change the policy idiom, abandoning the very language of ‘‘community rela-
tions’’ (which was seen by respondents, according to Harbison, as ‘‘tarnished,
outdated and divisive’’) in favor of the more neutral, and essentially more
liberal, term ‘‘good relations,’’ which had been employed in the Northern
Ireland Act 1998 (Harbison 2002, 8, 41–42, 49). A leading community rela-
tions professional in Northern Ireland told the author that the formulation
‘‘good relations’’ originated in Whitehall, not locally, and was seen as a more
inclusive term (author’s interview, Belfast, December 2007).
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The stated philosophy of the UK government’s Shared Future policy
also reflected a colonialist discourse on the conflict as an ‘‘Irish problem’’:
‘‘The underlying difficulty is a culture of intolerance, which we will need
to remedy if we are to make Northern Ireland a more ‘normal’ society’’
(Community Relations Unit 2003, 8, emphasis in the original). The stated
policy goal was ‘‘a shared society defined by a culture of tolerance: a nor-
mal, civic society, in which all individuals are considered as equals, where
differences are resolved through dialogue in the public sphere and where
all individuals are treated impartially. A society where there is equity,
respect for diversity and recognition of our interdependence’’ (Community
Relations Unit 2003, 10). It envisioned that a special state agency or watch-
dog would be established to promote the agenda.
Inherent in the consociational thesis is the principle that a divided soci-
ety must bear certain running ‘‘costs of duplication’’ in order to sustain
stability and avert conflict. The ‘‘integrationist’’ policy drive of 2000–2005,
however, was not only couched as a moral critique of the divided society
but also concealed a powerful managerialist ‘‘economic imperative’’ to
budgetary discipline and rationalization through an attack on the costs and
diseconomies of the divided society: ‘‘Parallel living and the provision of
parallel services are unsustainable both morally and economically. . . . Pol-
icy that simply adapts to, but does not alter these challenges, results in
inefficient resource allocations. These are not sustainable in the medium to
long-term’’ (Community Relations Unit 2005, 20).
The managerial attack on the economic irrationality of the divided soci-
ety was evident, for example, in the so-called Costs of the Divide report by
Deloitte, commissioned under British direct rule in 2005, but not published
until April 2007. It estimated that the ‘‘upper limit’’ of the costs of commu-
nity segregation in terms of security, public services, education, and hous-
ing amounted to about £1.5 billion annually, though only about £600
million could be directly estimated with any accuracy (Deloitte 2007, 27).
The key annual costs are: £504 million extra policing costs; £24 million
added to the housing bill; £10 million extra in education; £13 million for
community relations; £7 million on support for victims; about £50 million
in tourism losses; plus an estimated loss of some 27,600 jobs over seventeen
years. It works out at under £1,000 per person in Northern Ireland per
year.
Events demonstrated that British leaders were pragmatic about both the
new managerialist and the normative challenge to the Agreement. The
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Shared Future agenda was very quickly overtaken by the St. Andrews Agree-
ment of November 2006, which led to the restoration of the power-sharing
executive in Northern Ireland in May 2007. The new arrangement saw the
two main ‘‘ethnic’’ parties, DUP and Sinn Fe´in, agree to form a new gov-
ernment under the Agreement (with some modifications). All parties to the
St. Andrews Agreement were complicit in a ‘‘culture of silence’’ about the
sectarian divide. In annex b of the St. Andrew’s Agreement, the British
government promised to promote ‘‘the advancement of human rights,
equality and mutual respect,’’ but when one examines the content of its
proposals, the focus is on victims, security arrangements, and language
rights (St. Andrews Agreement 2006, annex b). The British government has
simply taken much of the liberal normative attack on segregation and the
concerns about diseconomies off its agenda as part of the quid pro quo of
reaching an agreement with Sinn Fe´in and the DUP to make the Agreement
work. Even accessing the Deloitte report through official channels is now
difficult. The policy push on a ‘‘Shared Future’’ was quietly ‘‘parked.’’ It
took almost three years for the new DUP–Sinn Fe´in executive to produce
its own policy on social transformation in the consultation exercise around
the Programme for Cohesion, Sharing and Integration (July 2010). A compar-
ison of this document with the Shared Future strategy reveals several sig-
nificant conceptual shifts that reflect a more realistic and pragmatic
understanding of Northern Ireland’s divided society. The Programme for
Cohesion document stresses practical tasks of creating shared and safe
spaces, through local community involvement. Its concern is with encour-
aging ‘‘mutual accommodation,’’ a perspective that is accepting of the eth-
nic divide, rather than the grand vision of ‘‘reconciliation,’’ and the
overcoming of ethnoreligious identities, inherent in A Shared Future. The
two strategies reflect fundamentally opposed understandings of the socio-
political dynamics of Northern Ireland. Cohesion assumes that ‘‘cultures’’
and ‘‘identities’’ are not only relatively fixed and enduring, but are to be
valued. One of the new executive’s strategic aims is to promote ‘‘pride in
who we are and confidence in our different cultural identities’’ (Programme
for Cohesion 2010, 2.3). Its vision is of ‘‘an intercultural society’’ with any
identity change occurring over the long term. The policy focus is on achiev-
ing equality of opportunity, and safe shared spaces. This contrasts with the
conceptual basis of A Shared Future, where identities were seen as being in
flux, mutable, and transformable. The Liberal critique of this policy shift
on society is that the Programme for Cohesion reflects the goals and interests
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262 James Hughes
of the ‘‘ethnic blocs’’ in the ‘‘reification of ‘cultures’ ’’ (Todd and Ruane
2010, 3–4).
Coexistence over Reconciliation
Reconciliation is a contested term with multiple meanings, the use of which
is disfigured by ambiguous jargon. For some advocates reconciliation is
essentially a process, while for others it is the end stage of a process (D.
Bloomfield 2006). The spectrum of reconciliation ranges from a pragmatic,
worldly kind of ‘‘peaceful coexistence’’ to the nirvana of religious ‘‘har-
mony.’’ For many activists engaged in the area of reconciliation, however,
coexistence is viewed negatively, even akin to a form of benign apartheid
(Kelly and Hamber 2005; Hamber and Kelly 2005). In fact we can distin-
guish between two influential process-based approaches: the secular and
the religious. We see direct influences on the conceptualization and jargon
of policy approaches to reconciliation in Northern Ireland in the period
after 2000 from the Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance
(IDEA) in Stockholm and the International Center for Transitional Justice
(ICTJ) in New York City. The concept of building a ‘‘shared future,’’ and
the idea that reconciliation involves a ‘‘process through which a society
moves from a divided past to a shared future,’’ seems to have been trans-
ferred into British policy documents from these sources (Bloomfield,
Barnes, and Huyse 2003, 12). The faith-based psychocultural version is
most closely associated with John Paul Lederach, who has by now achieved
the status akin to a guru in this field. There is also a great deal of overlap
in the rhetoric of the secular and the religious approaches.
Community relations activists and professionals working in Northern
Ireland have vigorously promoted a narrative that holds that the Agreement
would have been impossible without their decades of work on legal and
social justice, and equality and dialogue (Fitzduff 2001, 256). However,
there is a tendency to gloss over the unpalatable realities about reconcilia-
tion work in Northern Ireland: that ‘‘community relations’’ was highly
politicized and securitized as part of the British government’s strategy for
managing the conflict, that British army ‘‘community relations’’ units cre-
ated deep mistrust among Catholics, that civil society organizations were
overwhelmingly polarized on sectarian grounds, and that much of the effort
was grounded in churches and religious organizations, with the dialogue
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between government, political parties, and paramilitaries facilitated most
effectively by religious figures. Perhaps reflecting the relative strength of
religious organizations working in the fields of reconciliation, community
relations, and mediation in Northern Ireland, it is Lederach’s work that has
most informed practitioners since the mid-1990s. A committed Mennonite
Christian, Lederach drew on his experience as a mediator in Central
America to develop a thesis on ‘‘conflict transformation.’’ His stress on the
concept of ‘‘transformation’’ is concerned with developing reconciliation
in society and among individuals, far beyond the parameters entailed in
institutional conflict resolution designs (Lederach 1997; 1999; and 2003).
This discourse also shaped secular currents on ‘‘social transformation.’’
Lederach’s work is driven by Christian notions of nonviolence, mutual
respect, and peace building through dialogue. Since being first invited to
Northern Ireland in 1995 as part of the discussions surrounding the EU’s
Peace and Reconciliation I program, Lederach’s work has been enormously
influential in shaping the discourse about reconciliation. Lederach’s vision
of ‘‘conflict transformation’’ has also infiltrated the public policy arena
through project funding, for this is also a philosophy of social activism for
practitioners. It requires a core of enlightened believers who will push the
‘‘conflict transformation’’ process along.
The substantive content to the notion of ‘‘conflict transformation’’ is
less easy to discern. Lederach criticizes the ‘‘narrowness of resolution
approaches’’ because while they may solve problems in the short term they
do not create a dynamic of ‘‘constructive change.’’ Whereas prominent crit-
ics of consociationalism (Taylor, Wilson, Wilford, Dixon, and others) focus
their ire precisely on how its institutional design embeds ethnic blocs in
power, Lederach is largely unconcerned with the institutional outcomes to
peacemaking. But what kind of ‘‘constructive change’’ does Lederach envis-
age? This is never fully explained; rather Lederach loosely uses ill-defined
concepts such as building positive ‘‘relationships,’’ ‘‘changing lives for the
better,’’ and building ‘‘capacities which are creative, responsive, construc-
tive, and non-violent’’ (Lederach 2003, 69, 70). Lederach’s philosophy
places faith in dialogue at its core and appears to be a reformulation of the
Christian humanist idea that by ‘‘bringing people together’’ in a process of
dialogue it is possible to overcome divisions irrespective of their nature,
structure, or material basis.
In the case of Northern Ireland, the confusion over the meanings of
reconciliation has been accentuated by the fact that there is a range of
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advocates of reconciliation. We can usefully distinguish four main categories
of reconciliation actors in Northern Ireland. First, given the salience of reli-
gious identity and the organizational power of churches, it is no surprise that
there have been faith-based approaches to reconciliation since the mid-1960s.
The foundation of the ecumenical religious community at Corrymeela in
1965 provided a combination of neutral haven and forum for dialogue, and
a network of religious activists committed to reconciliation throughout the
‘‘Troubles’’. Religious figures have also played a significant role as mediators
at key junctures in the peace process. Second, there have been secular ideolog-
ical advocates of three main types: leftists (mainly trades unionists, and
community and voluntary sector activists), women’s groups, and liberal intel-
lectuals (mainly university academics and journalists). Third, there is an
interest-based approach to reconciliation from businesses, state agencies, and
local government professionals. Whereas the previous categories are princi-
pally value driven, which is to say that they are motivated by an altruistic
concern with building a more tolerant society through notions of ‘‘outreach,’’
the third category is mainly impelled by a functional imperative to enact
government legislation and policy preferences concerning nondiscrimination,
promoting good relations, and security, and with grappling with the disecon-
omies of the conflict and the divided society.
A fourth category of actors emerged in the latter stages of the ‘‘Trou-
bles’’ and is composed of what we may term the ‘‘mediation’’ professionals.
This includes NGOs and consultancy firms engaged in promoting the con-
cept of ‘‘mediation’’ and ‘‘dialogue’’ and disseminating international medi-
ation best practices within Northern Ireland. This group has been most
active in chasing large (though diminishing) pots of UK, Irish, EU, and
international funds. In totality these four categories encapsulated that part
of ‘‘civil society’’ in Northern Ireland that was active in the field of reconcil-
iation. Moreover, this sector too reflected the parallel organization of soci-
ety. The duration of the Northern Ireland conflict over some thirty years
despite the efforts of these groups is a powerful testament to the weak
capacity of ‘‘civil society’’ independently to mitigate conflicts in deeply
divided societies.
Peacemaking is a business, and something akin to a salariat has emerged
in the reconciliation sector. By the time of the Agreement, according to
official figures, there were approximately five thousand voluntary and com-
munity organizations alone in Northern Ireland, which provided employ-
ment to some thirty-three thousand people. By this stage of the conflict,
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there were more people engaged in this sector than were employed in
manufacturing. At this time, the gross annual income for the sector was
estimated to be around £500 million (Consultation Document on Funding
2000, 3). Of the four main sources of funding for peace building and
reconciliation (direct grants from the UK government; the EU’s Special
Support Programme for Peace and Reconciliation in Northern Ireland,
which includes six border counties of Ireland [hereafter referred to as the
Peace Programme]; the International Fund for Ireland (IFI), established
by the Anglo-Irish Agreement; and the Atlantic Philanthropies (a founda-
tion of US entrepreneur Chuck Feeney), the Peace Programme is the most
significant.
Established by the European Commission in 1995 following the first
cease-fires, the peace program was backed by Jacques Delors (commission
president in 1993–94) as an opportunity to build EU institutional power
and capacity in conflict resolution. The program has evolved in three
sequential stages: Peace I (1995–99), Peace II (2000–2004) and the Peace II
Extension (2005–6), and Peace III (2007–13). Northern Ireland received
£640 million in EU funding through the programs in the period 1995–2006.
Between 1986 and 2004, the IFI provided funding totaling over £465 mil-
lion, and the Atlantic Philanthropies funding totaled £230 million between
1982 and 2004 (Deloitte 2007, 24–27). The grand total for the period from
the early 1980s to 2006 is approximately £1.35 billion—about the same
amount as Deloitte’s estimate of the ‘‘costs of the ‘Troubles’.’’ A further 333
million was provided under Peace III, and Northern Ireland has received
hundreds of millions of euros through other programmes related to its
status as an ‘‘Objective 1’’ region. This funding has not only extended the
life of community relations organizations but has also helped to sustain
economic life in working-class ghettos, where project funds are normally
brokered and distributed by political organizations and former paramilitary
organizations (or both). Many of these projects involve former prisoners.
Equally, the funding has created a new professionalized, and somewhat par-
asitical, private sector ‘‘mediation’’ business, and facilitated the integration
of the managing cadre of that sector into the international peace and recon-
ciliation industry. The discourse and practices of the sector in Northern
Ireland cannot be understood without reference to international develop-
ments in this field. The influence of Lederach on framing practitioner min-
dsets is one important source of internationalization; another is the
theoretical and policy influence of the ICTJ, established in 2001.
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Based around legal practitioners and human rights activists with experi-
ence of democratization and ‘‘dirty wars’’ in South America, South Africa,
the Balkans, and elsewhere, the ICTJ has shaped international policy
approaches to transitional justice in postconflict societies. This kind of
internationalization could be usefully connected to McGarry and O’Leary’s
analysis of the political accommodation in Northern Ireland. If we examine
the accommodation in Northern Ireland through the lens of transitional
justice, we would expect to see significant developments along four key
dimensions: restorative justice (essentially—trials: punishing perpetrators,
ensuring impunity does not go unpunished), reparations (supporting vic-
tims and securing compensation), truth seeking (normally through a ‘‘truth
commission,’’ public hearings, eliciting statements of regret and wrong-
doing, developing a consensus narrative and a culture of forgiveness), and
finally institutional reform (primarily in the field of security and civil-
military relations).
The transitional justice thesis is that addressing its formulations is
essential for the successful move to a postconflict stable society, and the
best mechanism for guaranteeing that there is no return to violence. There
are many aspects of the Agreement that suggest that transitional justice
issues were marginal to the political accommodation. For example, there
was, unusually for our times, a de facto amnesty for perpetrators in North-
ern Ireland (officially termed the ‘‘accelerated release scheme’’). The few
major investigations of past atrocities are bogged down, inconclusive, and
expensive. As the Bloomfield report noted, even the issue of who is a ‘‘vic-
tim’’ is highly contentious in Northern Ireland (K. Bloomfield 1998). Vic-
tims’ commissioners have been appointed, and some £44 million of public
money had been allocated to support victims’ groups between 1998 and
2011; however, the issue has been peripheralized politically because of its
contentious nature.
The tentative, and some would say cynical, approach of the politicians
to transitional justice issues is evident in widespread criticism among Brit-
ish political elites of the Bloody Sunday enquiry (1998–2010), largely but
not solely focusing on its cost of approximately £400 million. The enquiry’s
‘‘Saville report’’ of June 2010 concluded that the killings by British para-
troopers in Derry in January 1972 were ‘‘unjustifiable’’ and that soldiers
had repeatedly lied to cover the war crime, leading to an unreserved apol-
ogy from the British prime minister, David Cameron (Report of the Bloody
Sunday Enquiry 2010; Cameron 2010). Peter Hain’s establishment in 2007
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of a consultative group of ‘‘wise persons’’ led by former Church of Ireland
head Lord Eames to make recommendations about how the past might be
best managed appears to have been motivated by the aim of keeping truth
recovery off the agenda, for as Hain put it: ‘‘Recent political progress in
Northern Ireland should make us pause and ask whether re-living or even
re-fighting the ‘‘Troubles’’ in the court room or the public inquiry or
through police investigation is really a healthy way forward. Whether a
focus on identifying issues which happened over 30 years ago at a time of
terrible conflict is productive for a society which has, after May 8 2007,
resolved that conflict politically. And whether the hundreds of millions of
pounds involved could not be better spent on the future’’ (Hain 2007b, 8).
The Consultative Group on the Past saw its mission as one that tied
‘‘lasting peace and prosperity’’ to a ‘‘comprehensive process’’ for dealing
with ‘‘legacy’’ issues relating to the ‘‘Troubles’’. Its final report, delivered in
January 2009, made a number of recommendations including the creation
of an independent Legacy Commission akin to a Truth and Reconciliation
Commission, which would have an international head and a budget of £100
million. The proposal was overshadowed by its most controversial pro-
posal: that the government should make ‘‘recognition payments’’ of
£12,000 (i.e., compensation) to all those who lost relatives, without distinc-
tion (Consultative Group on the Past 2009). This attempt to sidestep the
question of ‘‘who is a victim’’ was seized on by opponents of truth recovery.
Following a highly critical consultation exercise, the British government
quietly ‘‘parked’’ the report. Political parties and public opinion are sharply
divided across both communities on the issue of a truth commission. The
British government and the administration led by DUP and Sinn Fe´in have
been reluctant to fully address ‘‘truth’’ issues in open public debate. This is
despite the generally positive response to the Bloody Sunday enquiry report.
No doubt, it is not simply economic costs that act as the deterrent to such
investigations of the past, or that the nature of the ‘‘dirty war’’ in Northern
Ireland makes the protagonists wary of the reputational costs that would
follow from any serious wholesale investigation of the past. But also it is
the fact that the issue of dealing with past, competing narratives about the
conflict, and controversies of power displays of ritual and identity, remain
immensely contentious and that the political elites recognize they cannot
move on these issues too far ahead of their constituencies. By appointing
an outsider in July 2013, U.S. diplomat Richard Haass, as chairman of the
new Stormont all-party group to deal with the contentious issues of flags,
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parades, and the past, the governing parties in Northern Ireland aim to
renegotiate ritual from without, once again bypassing society just as the
Agreement itself did.
Conclusion
In reflecting on the pro et contra debate over peace and reconstruction in
Northern Ireland, I have argued here that a more fruitful analytical approach
is not to disaggregate the institutional peacemaking elements from the com-
plex social structure of the divided society and the challenges it poses to
postconflict transformation and reconciliation. For while the intricate details
of the consociational moment—the institutionally engineered ‘‘fixes’’ of the
Belfast Agreement and the St. Andrews Agreement—are comprehensively
analyzed by many, there are several key levels of analysis that are unsatisfacto-
rily addressed: the skewed packaging of the ‘‘model’’ by politicians, the erratic
management of social change, and the question of episodic managerial and
technocratic challenges to the Agreement.
It is an open question whether Northern Ireland constitutes a new
‘‘model’’ or ‘‘blueprint’’ for conflict resolution and postconflict reconstruc-
tion as regards its consociational institutional engineering and elite accom-
modation. The major lesson that policy makers claim to have drawn from
this case is that even the most protracted conflicts can be ended, and that a
realpolitik ‘‘dialogue’’ with the extremes, when bounded by commitments
to nonviolent means, can pay dividends for peacemaking. This packaging
downplays the irreplaceable value of consociational institutional engineer-
ing to building trust and accommodation among the main parties and their
leaderships in particular, even in the absence of a wider societal reconcilia-
tion or pursuit of transitional justice. The critics of consociationalism and
the advocates of conflict transformation approaches argue that the recon-
struction of a polarized society into a more ‘‘shared’’ and integrated one
is obstructed by the new impediments of ethnic power allocation under
consociationalism, precisely because communal coexistence is copperfas-
tened and a thicker societal reconciliation or transitional justice mecha-
nisms are not on the agenda. Here I have attempted to refocus attention
on the structural determinants of consociationalism in Northern Ireland.
One of the core structural features of the divided society, residential segre-
gation, has been analyzed to illustrate how the divided identities are a prod-
uct of the settler colonial foundation of state and society in Northern
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Ireland and its consolidation over centuries. Residential segregation was
also further reinforced by the British state’s securitization policy from the
very onset of the ‘‘Troubles.’’ The divided identities and parallel communi-
ties of Northern Ireland are at root a product of colonial authoritarian
social engineering and its construction of power asymmetries. Top-down
social engineering in today’s democratic environment, even under condi-
tions of greater equity and levelling of those power asymmetries, is unlikely
to easily or quickly undo the divide and achieve the kind of social transfor-
mation aspired to by the critics of the Agreement. For the latter are norma-
tively repelled not only by the institutionalization of ethnonational identity
in the architecture of government, but by the profundity of nationalist
cleavages and the democratic legitimacy of nationalist parties (whether Irish
or British Unionist), and the very persistence of ethnonational identity
itself.
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